The second seminar of day one, "Conflict in the Arab World: Reasons, Manifestations, and Repercussions", included Juan, the Richard P. Mitchell Collegiate Professor of History at Michigan University; Lina Khatib, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut; Hemen Hawram, head of the Foreign Relations Office of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); Maha Azzam, head of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council; and Abdelwahab El-Affendi, researcher of political affairs at the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the University of Westminster.
Dr. Cole addressed the roots of the problem in the region and the reasons behind the conflict, which are related to climatic changes like drought. To illustrate his point of view, he cited Syria's Ar-Raqqa province wherein 90% of livestock were destroyed and farms decayed as a result of drought and water shortages. Moreover, farmers were unable to cultivate harvests due to their mass emigration to cities in search of jobs. They, however, did not find employment and thus became disgruntled individuals.
Accordingly, the initial stage of the 2011 protests in Syria took place in cities that were dependent on agriculture, and the demands of the protestors were related to living and social standards. This applied to Iraq and Egypt as well as demonstrators in the former chanted for dignity and good living standards. We are thus reminded of the disputes that erupted among Turkey and Iraq over water resources such as the Euphrates River. However, the policies pertaining to water sources in specific countries are not relevant in this context.
After independence, some Arab countries provided their citizens with better services and living standards. During Gamal Abdul Nasser's presidency, Egypt laid out a strategy seeking to raise the income of its citizens. But after the Soviet Union collapsed, Arab states fell under US pressures to adopt economic liberalism and freedom of commerce as well as social engagement in educational programs and economic policies. Soon after, we saw Arab states like Tunisia adopt liberalism to in their economic and commercial systems, allowing for the income of citizens to still increase after the factories had been controlled by the community rather than the government.
As time went by, this conflict turned from a mere dispute prompted by social problems into an identity-based sectarian strife – and that is what we now see in Yemen and Syria.
Dr. Khatib addressed several issues, most notably the sectarian problem that represented an important factor in disputes across the Arab world. She argued that sectarianism was not the essence of conflict although some states established entities on sectarian bases, if not identities, that have been codified in the constitution, leading to the prevalence of sectarianism over the state within government bodies. This was the scenario in Iraq and may become the scenario in Syria. However, this political vision will prolong the crisis and deepen the gap between components of the society, and that will only complicate the problem.
In Iraq, ISIS militants exploited the marginalization, oppression, and torture inflicted on Sunnis under Maliki's rule. The Sunni community showed sympathy towards ISIS and hence, sectarianism served the interests of ISIS and the Assad regime. Perhaps, a solution to this issue can be achieved by establishing political representation on patriotism, as opposed to sectarianism, where all parties are represented in accordance with the basic political components of the country. Moreover, a constitution based on a federal or non-centralised government can be an positive factor in resolving conflicts.
Hawrami, however, discussed the Kurdish case, noting that the chemical attack on the Iraqi Kurds during Saddam Hussein's reign generated retaliatory sentiments and eradicated the nationalistic identity. This led to the designation of identities as Shiite, Sunni, or Kurdish.
Under the rule of a failed state and poor living standards, conflict turned into a chaotic dispute that extended beyond borders, especially in the case of Iraq. The expansions and seizures of ISIS militias resulted from the state's failure. If we looked into the number of militants in Baghdad, we can only wonder who is controlling Baghdad and who controls weaponry.
In Kurdistan, for example, members of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces lost their lives while attempting to restore Iraqi cities from the hands of ISIS militants. The current polarisation is the mere aftermath of domestic and international events. Not only did the conflict in Iraq flare up among its ethnic components, but it has gradually grown into mutual desire of retaliation among the different sectarian components of the society.
Hawrami believes that because Kurdish forces stopped ISIS militants and defeated them in several locations, Syria and Iraq did not fall into their hands. He also emphasised the necessity of admitting our mistakes and resorting to new methods of democratically coexisting with one another, as the region will undergo unpredictable major changes.
Nonetheless, Dr. Azzam argued that the reasons behind conflicts in the region date back to the colonial era in which conflict started as a form of fighting for freedom and the rights of citizens. Arab countries failed to achieve the demands of the people even after independence, and their peoples were let down and their hopes dissipated. Such a failure led to popular protests as an expression of complaints and objections.
After World War II, talk of United Nations human rights principles surfaced but were held along with double standards because they were not granted to many nations in the region. As a result, electoral fraud and oppression became prevalent. Large parts of the society suffered, and angry demonstrators took to the streets to call for the protection of citizens' rights and the application of the values of justice, which culminated into a violent conflict. Assad's implementation of unilateralism and tyranny was also seen in Egypt, leading to the rise of terrorism and extremism.
The international community and regional powers must reconsider their plans in the region and observe how conditions and situations change. They also need to make reform plans to create alternatives, because we cannot go back in time.
Repression, disrespect for the peoples, and the inability to express views openly as well as the killing of demonstrators have all been practiced by regimes in the region and have resulted in much pressure and humiliation. Everyone is heading towards a slippery slope where blood will be shed and freedoms will be trampled upon. Like anywhere else in the world, these peoples are willing to sacrifice for the sake of change. Therefore, their demands will continue albeit in the form of successive waves.
Because the international community only ever hears the voices of a very small group, i.e. rulers and lobbies of interests, the equation on the ground will never change and reform in the region, especially in Egypt and Syria, will never take place.
The final speaker, Dr. El-Affendi maintained that the region is currently witnessing a conflict of an unprecedented size and brutality. It demonstrates what he maintains is a bizarre phenomenon, "accepting colonialism", which Malik bin Nabi had previously addressed. The region now has attracted colonialism, and its events have spiraled out of control to the extent that any dispute among local entities results in foreign intervention through international organisations. Moreover, Arabs fairly acknowledge how much suffer; they do not censor casualty statistics, but some of them go too far to justify these casualties in support of one political stance against another.
He argued that we must make plans to resolve these crises, because the conflict currently taking place will lead to the death of national identity. The rise of sectarianism and the absence of loyalty to a unified nation in Iraq are manifested in the crisis resulting from conflicts in the Arab world.
This crisis mostly reveals the absence of a discourse calling for social unity and coherence and the emergence of one calling for the elimination and marginalisation of 'the other', which is becoming increasingly more obvious. What is more severely dangerous is that some thinkers seemed unable to find fault with the displacements and killings in their countries. They justify such violations as a necessary step to prevent larger catastrophes.
The prevalent discourse is becoming a bigger part of the problem. Elites and leaders failed to lay out a model for emulation. We must become a model in moral leadership and give up positions and status to protect values and principles. As former British Senior Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Baroness Sayeeda Warsi stated in her address to the 9th Al Jazeera Forum, she resigned from her post in the government in defense of the Palestinian cause.
The session was brimming with debates and responses centred on the catastrophic consequences of conflicts, both internally and externally, and solutions for the Arab world.
